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1 Introduction
The last 30 years have witnessed a dramatic increase in manufacturing exports by
developing countries, which lead to a deep structural change of trade patterns at the
worldwide level. These shifts fuelled fears in environmentalist circles that world
pollution would grow since it is generally admitted that lower income countries are
characterized by lower environmental regulations (see for example Dasgupta et al.
(1999)). In the trade and environment literature, this argument is usually known as
the ‘‘pollution haven’’ (PH) hypothesis. It has been theoretically challenged, because
even though less stringent (and poor) countries may specialize in polluting
industries (according to the PH argument), capital abundant (and rich) countries
tend to specialize in capital-intensive industries that also happen to be polluting, so
that the net effect of trade expansion on pollution is generally unclear (see Copeland
and Taylor (2004)). This theoretical ambiguity is paralleled by a large and growing
empirical literature (see e.g. Cole and Elliott (2003b) for recent evidence based on
both old and new trade models), and it is fair to say that the debate is still largely
unsettled, because results are sensitive to data availability, empirical methodology
and the type of pollutant considered.
Sulphur dioxide (SO2) is a pollutant frequently analyzed because of its suitable
characteristics: it is a by-product of goods production1 with strong regional effects,
available abatement technologies, and different regulations across countries.
Moreover, a deeper understanding of SO2 emissions contributes to a better
understanding of three environmental problems: air pollution and smog, acid rain,
and global climate change.2 The SO2 case is also a representative example of the
methodological difficulties faced when analyzing the trade and environment nexus.
One might say that the debate has been principally informed by studies following a
rigorous (and useful) methodology, but applied to indirect and potentially relatively
unrepresentative data [e.g. SO2 concentrations rather than production-related
emissions by Antweiler et al. (2001) or Frankel and Rose (2005), or economy-
wide emissions rather than industry-specific ones as in Cole and Elliott (2003a)].
With the exception of the recent work by Levinson (2007), which is limited to the
US case, a common feature of these studies is that their estimates of the link
between emissions and trade is indirect, due to the lack of disaggregated data
linking pollution directly to production and to the resulting trading activities.
This paper is an answer to the need for more direct and detailed evidence on the
link between trade and SO2 emissions at the worldwide level. Using new data
assembled in a companion paper which details a large and consistent database of
SO2 manufacturing emission intensities that vary across time, country and sector
(Grether et al. 2009), we analyze how trade, by reallocating labor and production
across countries and sectors over time, affects the overall level of SO2 emissions.
The analysis of the impact of trade on emissions is in three steps. First, we carry out
1 Manufacturing emissions account for approximately 45% of global anthropogenic SO2 emissions, the
rest being roughly split in half between power generation and other activities.
2 As pointed out by Stern (2005), better data on SO2 emissions give a more accurate picture of sulfate
aerosols, which have a cooling effect and are an important contributor to climate change.
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a growth-decomposition analysis based on observed worldwide changes in
production and trade flows over the last decade. Second, we carry out a
counterfactual analysis based on a constructed no-trade benchmark, no longer a
temporal analysis, although the results depend on the year selected to construct the
counterfactual benchmark. Third, we provide estimates of emissions due to trade-
related transport activities. Together the three approaches give a more complete
picture of the role of trade-related emissions.
In contrast to earlier studies, we cover a large number of countries and different
manufacturing sectors allowing us to follow a bottom-up approach3 at the
worldwide level. The evidence is based on anthropogenic manufacturing emissions
and their relationship with trade since our data do not include other types of
emissions related to natural phenomena or non-traded activities (e.g. volcanic
eruptions or household energy consumption). The disaggregated approach also
helps to isolate the role of globalization on the intriguing downward trend in SO2
emissions over the 1990–2000 periods. The paper shows that PH forces do exist, but
that they have been declining over the whole sample period.
Section 2 reports growth-decompositions of SO2 emissions for 62 countries
(which account for over 75% of world emissions over the period), seven sectors (six
‘‘dirty’’ and one ‘‘clean’’ covering all remaining manufacturing sectors) and three
base years (1990, 1995, 2000). Section 3 turns to the no-trade counterfactual while
Sect. 4 takes into account trade-induced transport effects. Section 5 concludes.
2 Temporal decomposition 1990–2000
According to available estimates, world manufacturing SO2 emissions have been
falling during the 1990s. Was this obtained thanks to or in spite of increasing trade
flows? Taking into account trade flows, this section identifies the technological and
structural changes that have contributed to the reduction in global emissions. As
trade allows countries with different polluting intensities to specialize over time,
trade expansion may either increase or decrease world emissions depending on
whether dirty production tends to be shifted towards dirtier or cleaner countries.
Following a commentary on aggregate trends, we move on to a more systematic
growth decomposition exercise into scale, composition and technique effects based
on the disaggregated data. To our knowledge, it is the first time that such a
decomposition exercise is performed at the worldwide level.
2.1 Data sources and aggregate trends
The paper relies on two main data sources. Trade flows, output and employment
figures are from Nicita and Olarreaga (2007) while SO2 emission intensities (i.e.
3 By ‘‘bottom-up’’ we mean an analysis that is based on disaggregated emission and economic activity
data instead of performing a ‘‘top-down’’ approach where information on structural changes is inferred
from regression analysis performed on aggregate data.
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kilograms of SO2 per employee or per dollar) which vary across time, sector and
country are from our companion paper.4
Figure 1 presents the evolution of SO2 emissions, output and employment in the
manufacturing sector at the world level. The contrast is striking between the decline
in manufacturing emissions by 10%, while employment and output are concurrently
rising by 10 and 20% respectively. Overall, manufacturing became a lot cleaner at
the worldwide level.
Three reasons for this decline in emission are reviewed in the different panels of
Fig. 2. Figure 2a shows an increase in the output share of clean products.5 However,
employment shares follow an opposite trend, suggesting that the explanation is more
complex and linked to differences in productivity gains between ‘‘clean’’ and
‘‘dirty’’ sectors.
A second possibility would be that, contrarily to what is feared by environmen-
talists, production could have shifted towards cleaner countries. Splitting the
sample into a ‘‘North’’ and ‘‘South’’ group in Fig. 2b gives ammunitions to the
environmentalists: the share of the South is rising, particularly for employment,
which increases from 50 to almost 60% across the sample period. Thus, although it
remains to be confirmed that Southern countries are indeed dirtier (see below), the
global shift towards cleaner countries seems an even more inadequate explanation
than the previous one.
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Fig. 1 Global trends in manufacturing emissions, employment and output (1990 = 100)
4 These data are based on the combination of three data sets: the Emission Database for Global
Atmospheric Research (henceforth EDGAR), compiled by Olivier and Berdowski (2001) and Olivier
et al. (2002), the Industrial Pollution Projection System of the World Bank (see Hettige et al. (1995)) and
the recent estimates of Stern (2006). Two particular adjustments were necessary to combine these data
sets. First, as Stern’s national estimates take better abatement activities into account, they were used to
adjust the original EDGAR emission intensities by proportional scaling. Second, we completed the output
and employment figures which are missing in the original data of Nicita and Olarreaga (2007) by using a
simple imputing procedure.
5 Unlike the specific convention followed in the rest of this paper, the definition of ‘‘clean’’ and ‘‘dirty’’
products used to construct Fig. 2a is based on the more usual classification of the 28 ISIC-3 digit sectors
into five clean, 5 dirty and 18 ‘‘in-between’’ categories (e.g. Copeland and Taylor (2003)).
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So we are left with the third explanation: a shift towards cleaner technologies.
Figure 2c is consistent with this view, as it shows that the average emission
intensity (whether manufacturing activity is measured by output or labor) is
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Fig. 2 Three alternative explanations of the fall in SO2 emissions. a Employment and output shares for
clean and dirty sectors; Clean sectors ISIC 3-digit sectors 321 and 382-385, Dirty sectors ISIC 3-digit
sectors 341, 351, 369, 371 and 372. b Employment and output shares for North and South; North United
States, Canada, high income Asia and Europe, South Latin America, Africa and low income Asia. c
Emission intensities for North and South
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declining for both North and South. Note also that the difference in levels
between North and South is quite striking when intensity is measured in terms of
emissions per unit of output, with emission intensity about five times higher in
the South and the relative gap remaining roughly constant. However, most of this
gap seems to be due to productivity differences: when measured in terms of
emissions per unit of labor, Northern and Southern emission intensities look a lot
more similar.
So far, it appears that the major force behind the decline in manufacturing
emissions has been technical progress, which seems to have affected both poor and
rich countries alike. Moreover, this technique effect has been stronger than the scale
effect, as global emissions have declined in spite of the increase in both indicators of
manufacturing activity. Only the more disaggregated decompositions that follow
can confirm (or infirm) these preliminary conclusions.
2.2 Scale, technique and (two) composition effects
As in Grossman and Krueger (1991), we present formulas that identify the
importance of the scale, technique and composition effects identified in the
literature. Define emissions per unit of employment (rather than per unit output) to
capture the scale effect by total employment (rather than total output).6 Let then Lkit
represent employment in activity k in country i, year t, and ckit the emission intensity
per unit of labor. Then the resulting SO2 emissions (E) at the sector, country and
global levels are given by:
Ekit ¼ ckitLkit; Eit ¼
X
k
ckitLkit; Et ¼
X
k
X
i
ckitLkit: ð1Þ
For each country, national emissions can be decomposed into a scale (changes in
manufacturing employment), composition (changes in the allocation of labor across
sectors) and technique effect (changes in emission intensity per unit labor). The
same decomposition carries across countries (adding another source of composition
effect, across countries this time). To this end, world emissions (Et) have first to be
rewritten as the product of world manufacturing employment (Lt) times world
average emission intensity, the latter being a weighted average across all countries:
Et ¼ Lt
X
i
/Ltit cit; ð2Þ
where /Ltit is the share of country i in world employment, /
Lt
it  LitLt ,
7 and cit is
country i’s average emission intensity, cit  EitLit .
6 Using labor instead of output as the scaling variable leads to lower scale and technique effects (as
productivity gains are excluded) but hardly affects the order of magnitude of the composition effects
which are the focus here (see our companion paper for further discussion of the relative merits of each
scaling factor and comparisons under the two approaches).
7 The following notational convention is used: /Zwv is the share of Zv in the aggregate Zw, where
v,w = kit,kt,it and Z = L,E. For example, /Etit is the share of country i in global emissions, /
Et
it  EitEt .
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Using a ‘‘^’’ to denote percentage changes and neglecting interaction terms
(which are uniformly allocated to main effects in the application), total logarithmic
differentiation of (2) yields (3) which shows that global growth of SO2 emissions
can be decomposed into a scale effect, L^t, a between-country effect,
P
i /
Et
it /
Lt
it
 ^
,
and a within-country effect,
P
i /
Et
it citð Þ
^
:
E^t ¼ L^t þ
X
i
/Etit /
Lt
it
 ^ þ
X
i
/Etit citð Þ
^
: ð3Þ
The average country intensity can also be written as a weighted average of
sectoral intensities, with weights given by the share of each sector in national
manufacturing employment, i.e. cit ¼
P
k /
Lit
kitckit (/
Lit
kit  LkitLit ). Thus, the third term in
Eq. (3) can be decomposed further, leading to the final expression:
E^t ¼ L^t þ
X
i
/Etit /
Lt
it
 ^ þ
X
k
X
i
/Etkit /
Lit
kit
 ^ þ
X
k
X
i
/Etkit ckitð Þ
^
: ð4Þ
. In (4), the third term on the RHS represents the between-sector effect and the fourth
the technique effect. This last expression is the most complete, but its application is
conditioned to the availability of data at the sector level. Below, we present results of
the decomposition first for the national level data used by previous authors [i.e.
Eq. (3)], then for the disaggregated manufacturing data assembled here (i.e. Eq. (4)).
2.3 Decomposition results
Table 1 applies the decomposition from (3) to the aggregate data and time periods
used by Cole and Elliott (2003a) and Stern (2005).8 In this Table, the within-country
effect lumps together the between-sector and technique effects. All decompositions
are in broad agreement showing a reduction in emissions, and the results are very
close when there is period (1980–1990) and sector overlap. This is because the
sample used by Cole and Elliott (2003a) includes all the major emitters present in
Stern’s sample. Comparing our results with those in Stern (2005) over the period
1990–2000 indicates larger differences. This is probably because Stern’s economy-
wide estimates capture the Engel-related shift of activities from manufacturing to
largely non-polluting service activities.
Two further comments are in order. First, apart from the 1960–1970 period, all
studies reflect negative between-country and within-country effects that help
mitigate the impact of the strong scale effect. This suggests that the composition
effects brought up by trade throughout the period have not been so devastating. One
possible explanation is that pollution-generating activities being largely weight-
8 We also tried without success to apply this decomposition to the SO2 concentration data of Antweiler
et al. (2001). However, we failed to convert these concentration data into emission data because the link
between the two is too complex and data demanding (see for an example Schichtel (1996)). Indeed, when
we used the method proposed by Giannitrapani et al. (2006) to recover emission data from the
concentration data, the regression lacked explanatory power.
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reducing, the scope for PH patterns has been rather limited, resulting in quite
effective pollution-reduction policies.9 Second, the Stern data by decade indicate
that the turning point for SO2 emissions took place in the 1980s and that the main
driving factor behind this reversal is the within-country effect, which becomes
negative in the 1970s and ever stronger since then. This may hide both a shift
towards cleaner activities and the adoption of cleaner techniques, which we now try
to disentangle.
Application of (4) in the first line of Table 2 shows that the large within-country
effect (17%) contributing to a decline in emissions identified before works mainly
through the greening of production technologies as the technique effect reduced
emissions by 14% over the 1990–2000 period. The trends identified here are
difficult to reconcile with a ‘‘PH view’’ of the world. If PH forces were prevalent,
one would expect a global shift of manufacturing labor towards dirtier countries and
dirtier activities (as labor productivity tends to be smaller in dirty countries) coupled
with few incentives to adopt cleaner technologies.
The small significance of PH forces is confirmed when the decomposition is
carried-out separately for exports and for domestic use (bottom part of Table 2).10
Exports, which accounted for 22% of emissions in 1990, contributed significantly
both to the growth in emissions because of the increasing share of trade in
manufacturing (80%) but also to the decline in emissions through the composition
effects (between country and between sector). This pattern confirms that export
growth was concentrated in the cleanest sectors. Here again, if PH forces were
Table 1 Comparison of SO2 growth decomposition across different data sets (%)
Data set Period Number of
countries
Sectora Scale
effect
Between-
country
effect
Within-
country
effect
Total
effectb
This study 1990–2000 62 Manufacturing 9.51 -2.36 -17.00 -9.85
Cole and Elliott (2003) 1980–1990 26 Economy-wide 21.70 -6.64 -16.71 -1.65
1975–1990 33.60 -9.93 -24.87 -1.25
Stern (2005) 1960–1970 146 Economy-wide 20.79 -4.73 15.43 31.49
1970–1980 23.13 -6.48 -7.82 8.83
1980–1990 22.28 -6.74 -17.06 -1.52
1990–2000 144 15.47 -3.86 -33.52 -21.92
1960–2000 89.50 -19.36 -60.45 9.68
See Eq. 3 for decomposition formula. All effects are expressed in percentage points
a This study is restricted to manufacturing-related emissions while the other studies contain total
anthropogenic emissions (coming from manufacturing, transport, heating, …)
b Total effect = scale effect ? between-country effect ? within-country effect
9 Based on a gravity model, Grether and de Melo (2004) provide evidence that ‘‘dirty’’ industries have
higher transport costs than ‘‘clean’’ industries.
10 Labor is allocated by end use in proportion of output. In Table 2, the total effect of the first line is
equal to the emission-weighted average of the total effects of the second and third lines, but this property
does not extend to the other effects.
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strong, the between-sector effect would be negative for domestic use and positive
for exports, the opposite of the observed pattern.
These aggregate results are based on summing the elements of (4) over 62
countries and seven sectors (434 combinations). Hence it is natural to identify
influential countries and sectors by grouping together the relevant combinations.
Figure 3 ranks the countries (Fig. 3a) and activities (Fig. 3b) that account for the
bulk of the change in emissions. We concentrate here on absolute effects to isolate
the combinations of sectors and countries that have experienced the largest (be it
positive or negative) structural change in SO2 emissions. Figure 3a lists 12 countries
that account for three quarters of the cumulative effects. Except for Chile, Peru and
India, all countries contribute to a decline in emissions. The right-hand panel carries
out the same decomposition as in Table 2. We find negative technique effects for all
countries but for the three mentioned above and also large technique effects for
China (-10%) and Germany (-3.3%).11 Figure 3b reports the ranking for the six
dirty industries and the residual ‘‘clean’’ sector. Looking at the net contribution to
the decline in emissions, the leading sectors are petroleum and coal products,
followed by chemicals and iron and steel, with most of the contribution to the
decline coming from the adoption of cleaner technologies. Non-ferrous metal stands
out as the only sector with a strong net growth in emissions.
These findings are broadly confirmed when the results are reported at the most
disaggregated level (see Table A6 in Grether et al. (2007)). Among the most
influential commodity-country combinations, Chile and Peru stand out with a
positive rather than negative technique effects for their copper smelting activities.12
Non-ferrous metal is also the most influential sector in China.
Table 2 Scale, composition and technique effects (percent)
Shares in 1990 Total effect Decomposition of total effect
Labor
share
Emission
share
Scale Between
country
Between
sector
Technique
Total effecta 100 100 -9.85 9.55 -2.44 –3.03 –13.94
Decomposition by end use
Domestic use 79.40 77.38 –19.17 –12.61 –1.86 11.88 –16.57
Exports 20.60 22.62 22.00 80.80 –19.66 –32.57 –6.57
a Slight differences in results with those in Table 1 come from the inclusion of one additional interaction
term. The total effect is a weighted average of the different end use effects where emission shares are used
as weights
11 These estimated magnitudes for China should be interpreted with caution, since the emission totals are
computed from official statistics which are believed to exaggerate the reduction in intensities (see Stern
(2005: 170) for a discussion of differences in estimates across sources).
12 Although Olivier et al. (2002) indicate that SO2 emission for non-ferrous metals have a large
uncertainty estimate, it is clear that this sector is an important contributor to SO2 emissions and that Chile
is the world’s largest producer (see for example Anthony et al. (2004)). Miketa and Mulder (2005) have
shown that this sector is also the only one where energy productivity divergence has been observed, while
Newbold (2006) stresses recent efforts to implement environmental systems, leaving hope for a negative
technique effect after 2000.
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Summing up, the decompositions suggest that the (temporal) reallocation of
production brought by trade (or between-country effect in our framework) has led to
a small reduction (around 2–3%) rather than to an increase in SO2 emissions at the
world level. This result is quite robust across databases and should mitigate the fears
raised by environmentalists. However, to get a fuller sense of trade-related effects,
one must move beyond a temporal analysis and carry out a counterfactual analysis
based on a no-trade benchmark.
3 Would autarky be any cleaner?
By allowing production to be decoupled from consumption, trade leads to a
different level of world emissions than in a no-trade situation. To this effect, we
(a) Total effect
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4
Germany
Chile
Poland
United States
United Kingdom
Canada
Korea, Rep.
France
China
Peru
Italy
India
Total
Change in emissions (percent)
Decomposition
-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10
Change in emissions (percent)
scale effect between-country effect
between-sector effect technique effect
Total effect
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4
Petroleum and Coal Products
Chemicals
Non-Ferrous Metals
Iron and Steel
All other sectors
Paper and Products
Non-Metallic Mineral Products
Total
Change in emissions (percent)
-15 -1 -5 0 5 10
Change in emissions (percent)
scale effect between-country effect
between-sector effect technical effect
-20 
(b)
Decomposition
Fig. 3 Growth decomposition by country and sector. a Contribution of each country to total effect
(ranked by decreasing absolute total effect) b Contribution of each sector to total effect (ranked by
decreasing absolute total effect)
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construct a simple no-trade anti-monde and compare it with the emissions observed
with the actual production and trade figures.
3.1 A simple no-trade benchmark
Define a simple no-trade benchmark in which each country now produces what it
was importing under the (observed) trade equilibrium. This line of reasoning
abstracts from resource constraints or price effects in order to focus on the
interaction between trade patterns and emission intensity differences. If the cleanest
countries tend to be the largest importers of dirty goods, then trade will tend to
increase global emissions, by shifting dirty production towards dirty countries,
much along the lines of the PH hypothesis. However, this very direct estimate
should be taken with a grain of salt, since the great bulk of trade in dirty products
comes from natural-resource-based products, which, by definition, are not subject to
comparative advantage, and could not be produced locally (e.g. France would
probably not be able to produce its observed consumption of copper products). In
sum, this simple approach provides, at best, suggestive first-order effects that would
have to be extended by building a no-trade anti-monde using general equilibrium
techniques.13
Take then sector k in country i year t, and denote local production by Qkit,
domestic (so-called ‘‘apparent’’) consumption by Ckit, and exports (imports) by Xkit
(Mkit), all values being expressed in current dollars. Neglecting inventories,
Qkit ? Mkit = Ckit ? Xkit. This relationship, however, will not hold for emissions to
the extent that imports (and thus parts of consumption) are produced with a different
technology. To estimate DEt, the change in production-embodied emissions,
generated by a shift from the autarkic to the trade situation, we compute the change
in embodied emissions when production shifts from the apparent consumption level,
Ckit = Qkit ? Mkit -Xkit, to the actual production level, Qkit. Let then gkit represent
SO2 emissions per unit dollar, while ‘kit represents labor productivity, so that the
relationship between per dollar and per unit labor intensities is gkit = ckit /‘kit. The
change in emissions at the sector level becomes:
DEkit ¼ gkitQkit  gkitCkit ¼ gkit Xkit  Mkitð Þ; ð5Þ
which means that the change in emissions generated by trade is just equal to the
trade balance times the corresponding domestic intensity coefficient. Aggregating
across sectors:
DEit ¼ gXit Xit  gMit Mit; ð6Þ
where gXit ¼
P
k /
Xit
kit gkit (g
M
it ¼
P
k /
Mit
kit gkit) is the average export (import) intensity
of country i (we extend the convention of the /Zwv notation to Z = X,M,Q). To bring
out the role of trade, it is convenient to also aggregate (5) across countries.
Straightforward manipulations lead to the following expression for the change in
world emissions for sector k:
13 See also Antweiler (1996) for the inclusion of input-output relationships in a similar context.
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DEkt ¼ Mktnrkt; ð7Þ
where Mkt is world imports (or exports) of good k (Mkt =
P
iMkit), n is the number
of countries in the world, and rkt is the covariance between pollution intensity and
the difference between the export and the import share of country i in world imports
of good k, i.e. rkt ¼ cov XkitMkitMkt ; gkit
 
. The expression shows that, apart from the
role of scaling factors (n,M,g), the trade-induced change in world emissions will be
particularly large if the countries with the largest trade deficits also tend to be the
cleanest ones. This is consistent with intuition and the PH view, so we name this
covariance term the PH covariance.
We can now aggregate either (6) or (7) to obtain the total change in emissions at
the worldwide level, DEt. For comparison purpose, we scale this change by
worldwide emission levels in autarky, Et ¼ gCt Ct, where Ct is apparent consumption
and gCt is the world average pollution intensity, g
C
t ¼
P
k
P
i /
Ct
kitgkit. This leads to
the following expressions:
DEt
Et
¼
P
i DEit
Et
¼ Xt
Ct
gXt  gMt
 
gCt
; ð8aÞ
DEt
Et
¼
P
k DEkt
Et
¼ Xt
Ct
nrt
gCt
; ð8bÞ
where Xt = Mt is total exports or imports, g
X
t ¼
P
i /
Xt
it g
X
it (g
M
t ¼
P
i /
Mt
it g
M
it ) is the
world average emission intensity in exports (imports) and rt is the world average
PH covariance (rt ¼
P
k /
Mt
kt rkt). Both expressions reflect the fact that trade
exacerbates emissions when the largest importers of the most polluting products are
also the cleanest producers. Both expressions also show that the impact of trade on
world emissions corresponds to the product between an average trade openness ratio
(Xt/Ct) and a PH ratio (either g
X
t  gMt or nrt divided by gCt ). But while (8a) is
helpful to identify those countries with the largest contribution to the overall
change, (8b) is more convenient to identify the sectors that play the most important
role.
3.2 Counterfactual estimates
Table 3 summarizes the results of this counterfactual applied to 1990 and 2000. As
shown in the first line of the Table, under this scenario where apparent consumption
is replaced by observed production, opening up to trade leads to an increase of
roughly 10% in emissions in 1990. Interestingly, the corresponding estimate for
2000 shows a much smaller increase of 3.5%. On the one hand, subject to the caveat
that much of trade in pollution-intensive products is natural-resource-based trade,
this supports the PH view. Indeed, the average PH covariance is positive for both
years, which means that the largest net exporters tend to be the dirtiest producers.
However, on the other hand, and perhaps more importantly, the results also show
that the PH pattern has almost vanished over time. The decrease in the PH ratio, by
more than 75% over 10 years, is particularly dramatic, and even more so when one
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takes into account the decrease by more than 25% of the average pollution intensity
(which appears in the denominator of the PH ratio).
Disaggregated results confirm the above patterns and help identify the largest
contributors to the overall effects (see Tables A7–A9 in Grether et al. (2007)). When
the contribution is positive, it is of the PH type, while it is of the ‘‘green-haven’’
type when the contribution is negative. Regarding countries first, the most
preeminent pollution havens in both periods are Chile, South Africa and Peru, while
China is a green haven and Indonesia switches from PH in 1990 to green haven in
2000. Regarding sectors, the most influential ones are non-ferrous metals, a strong
PH contributor in both periods, and petroleum and coal products, which switch from
pollution to green havens over the sample period.
In short, the counterfactual analysis suggests that the observed world with trade is
in accordance with the PH argument, i.e. trade leads to an increase in world SO2
emissions compared to the no-trade benchmark. However, the 1990s witnessed both
a general shift towards cleaner technologies and a relative shift of dirty production
towards cleaner countries. Both shifts strongly reduced the PH pattern that
characterized the beginning of the period. As a result, at the end of the period, even
if trade intensity had increased, the PH bias had shrunk so much that the net
contribution of trade to global emissions has been reduced by two-thirds. Note,
however, that since trade, by promoting growth, would also increase emissions,
these first-order effects may represent a lower bound.
4 Transport-related emissions
A discussion of the role of trade on emissions would be incomplete if transport-
related emissions were not factored in. Surprisingly, emissions directly emitted by
international transport are not analyzed in the current trade and environment
literature, while it is one of the main arguments of anti-globalization activists.
Consider then the following back-of-the-envelope calculations based on three
transport modes (rail, road and ships) and on a range of estimates to account for the
Table 3 Impact of trade on world emissions and its decomposition
Formulaa Effect 1990 2000 Change (%)
(a)(b) DEtEt Total emission change (%) 9.75 3.35 –66
(a) XtCt Trade openness ratio 0.20 0.29 ?46
(b) = (c)/(d) nrt
gCt
PH ratio 0.49 0.12 –77
(c) = (e) - (f)b nrt PH covariance 1.52 0.26 –83
(d)b gCt Average pollution intensity 3.12 2.28 –27
(e)b gXt Average export pollution intensity 4.76 2.72 –43
(f)b gMt Average import pollution intensity 3.24 2.46 –24
a See Eqs. (8a) and (8b) in the text
b Expressed in g/USD
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diversity of available sources of average SO2 emissions per tonne-km (tkm)
shipped.14
International shipment estimates are reported in the middle part of Table 4.15
Results show an increase in tonnage, value and in tkm tonnage. The increase in tkm
translates into a similar increase in transport-related emissions. As a result, the share
of transport-related emissions in total production-related emissions increases over
the period (see bottom part of Table 4). Taking the average estimates, international
trade-related transport emissions have accounted for about 5–9% of worldwide
manufacturing-related production emissions of SO2. Comparing these figures with
those of Table 3 suggests that transport-related emissions have gone from
accounting for roughly one third to three quarters of total trade-related emissions
across the 1990–2000 period. To put it differently, if we add up emissions coming
Table 4 Emissions from international shipments
SO2 emission coefficient (g/tkm) Share in world
shipments
(percent of tkm)Lower Upper
A. Transport mode
Raila 0.07 0.18 12
Roada 0.10 0.43 14
Shipb 0.19 0.52 74
100
Average emission coefficient (g/tkm) 0.16 0.47
1990 2000
B. Shipmentsc
Shipment volume (billion tonnes) 0.37 0.46
Shipment (trillion tkm) 2.01 3.81
Shipment value (trillion current USD) 6.54 9.68
C. Transport related emissions (percent)d Lower 2.77 4.50
Upper 8.15 13.32
Average 5.46 8.91
Trade-related emissions (percent)e 9.75 3.35
a From OECD (1997)
b Network for Transport and Environment (NTM calc, 2003)
c Distance data comes from CEPII (2006), mode shares for 1995 from the EC (1999)
d Percent of worldwide production-related emissions
e Report of the first line of Table 3
14 The variability of transport-related emissions is only cross-sectional due to data availability. The share
of airplanes in terms of manufacturing tkm shipments is so small that it can be neglected as a transport
mode.
15 International distance between the most important agglomerations has been corrected by the average
distance between producers and consumers for each country. This takes into account the fact that, if there
were no trade, goods would be shipped anyway within each country from producers to consumers.
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from trade-related composition effects and trade related transport activities, we
obtain that global worldwide manufacturing emissions are increased through trade
by 16% in 1990 and 13% in 2000, i.e. the strong decline in the PH pattern identified
in the previous section is almost eaten away by the increase in transport-related
emissions.
Any interpretation of these results should however be taken with caution. We
only dispose of transport data information for 1995, while one would expect that
composition (transport mode changes), scale (increase in global tkm) and technique
effects (decrease in emission intensities per tkm) have also taken place for the
transport sector between 1990 and 2000.
5 Conclusions
Combining data from different sources to obtain country, sector and year-specific
pollution coefficients and ‘‘taking the data seriously’’, this paper investigates the
role of trade in worldwide SO2 manufacturing. First, decompositions into scale,
composition and technique effects show that the increase in manufacturing activities
is roughly compensated by a decline in (per unit of labor) emissions due to the
adoption of cleaner production techniques. Second, about one-fifth of the ‘‘within-
country’’ effect (i.e. when sector-level data are not available) is in fact due to a shift
towards cleaner industries (the rest corresponding to the technique effect). Third, the
aggregate composition effects are (negative and) small with respect to the scale
effect, which suggests that the PH hypothesis debated in the trade and environment
literature, has only had a limited impact, at least over this period. These orders of
magnitude, which are directly obtained from disaggregated data rather than inferred
from regression exercises, deserve attention per se because they help weigh the
relative importance of the scale effect vis-a`-vis other effects, which work in the
opposite direction and are often neglected in the public debate. Besides, the by-
sector and by-country estimates also help identify ‘‘pollution havens’’ versus ‘‘green
havens’’, and hence where to direct emission-reduction Pigovian efforts.
This growth-decomposition analysis of the role of trade is extended by estimates
based on a constructed no-trade anti-monde. First, compared to a no-trade
benchmark in which every country has to produce locally what it is actually
importing, observed international trade increased emissions by 10% in 1990, but
only by 3.5% in 2000. Thus large net importers tend to be clean countries in 1990
but this PH pattern looses its importance over time. Second, back-of-the-envelope
estimates of emissions related to transport activities are added to these estimates.
Given the increase in international transport, related emissions have almost doubled
over the sample period. Adding up trade (compared to autarky) and trade-related
transport emissions, worldwide manufacturing emissions increased by 16% in 1990
and by 13% in 2000 compared to the hypothetical no-trade benchmark.
Several caveats are in order. On the data side, enlarging the sample to more
countries and pollutants, or increasing the disaggregation level would all be
desirable. On the methodological side, our first-order estimates do not control
for price effects, input-output relationships or the endogeneity of trade and
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environmental policies, all of which are likely to be of practical importance. These
effects could be taken into account relatively easily in a multi-country general
equilibrium simulation model which would also be an appropriate setting to study
the effects of Pigovian taxation. Both extensions should be the focus of forthcoming
efforts.
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